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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades emissions trading has become increasingly popular as an 
environmental policy instrument for air pollution control. The central advantage of emissions 
trading is that firms can flexibly choose to meet their targets, thereby achieving in principle 
the lowest overall cost for an aggregate emissions cap. In a historical context, the U.S. sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) cap-and-trade program initiated in the mid 1990ies under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments is considered as a successful “Grand Policy Experiment” proving substantial 
economic efficiency gains of market-based emission control policies over command-and-
control policies, i.e., predetermined technologies or standards (Stavins, 1998). 
 
Emissions trading can provide particularly high efficiency gains in climate change mitigation: 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases have the same effect for global warming 
wherever they are emitted and compliance costs differ dramatically across sources. Given the 
considerable potential for cost savings (Weyant, 1999), where-flexibility through emissions 
trading has become a condition-sine-qua-non for the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.  
 
Striving for cost-effectiveness of its climate policy, the European Union (EU) has launched an 
EU-internal emission trading scheme (EU ETS) for emission-intensive installations as the 
central pillar to comply with the Kyoto Protocol (EU, 2003a). The EU ETS was established in 
2005 and entered its second phase in 2008. As the first large-scale international greenhouse 
gas (GHG) trading program, the EU ETS represents a landmark environmental policy. To date 
the EU ETS covers more than 12,000 installations in 6 major industrial sectors across 27 EU 
countries. Each EU country must partition its national emissions budget under the Kyoto 
Protocol between sectors covered by the EU ETS and the rest of the economy within the so-
called national allocation plans (NAPs). The EU ETS thus implies a hybrid regulation scheme 
as sectors (e.g., households or transport) that are not covered, require complementary 
regulation in each EU member state to comply with the national emission reduction targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Given its size and institutional complexity, the EU ETS has been referred to as the “Grand 
New Policy Experiment” for market-based mitigation programs (Kruger and Pizer, 2004). In 
fact, the performance of the EU ETS may be pivotal for the prospects of a global greenhouse 
gas trading system: Environmental policy makers around the world view the EU ETS as a 
unique opportunity to gain critical insights into the design and implementation of a market-
based environmental program. The outstanding policy relevance of the EU ETS also explains 
the huge interest of the academic community to draw viable lessons on actual experiences of 
emissions trading including key issues such as allowance allocation rules, banking and 
borrowing provisions, firm-level market power, provisions for monitoring, reporting and 
verification, innovation incentives, implications on competitiveness of firms and sectors, or 
global environmental effectiveness of unilateral climate policies, i.e., leakage (for an 
overview see, e.g., the symposium on the EU ETS by Ellerman et al., 2007).1  
 
One central feature of the EU ETS that has so far received little attention in the literature is 
the decentralized structure of emissions regulation across multiple jurisdictions. Kruger et al. 
(2007) discuss in qualitative terms some of the induced political, economic and administrative 
challenges. They argue that linking of national systems will make it increasingly difficult to 
                                                 
1 A bibliography on tradable permits, which covers a larger part of the pertinent academic publications, is provided by T. 
Tietenberg under http://www.colby.edu/~thtieten/trade.html. 
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achieve an efficient balance of the emission reduction burden across trading and non-trading 
sources.2 The alternative – potentially more efficient – coordination mechanism might 
therefore be price harmonization across multiple jurisdictions rather than the linking of 
emission trading systems. 
 
Like Kruger et al. (2007) we are concerned with the efficient balance of the emission 
reduction burden across trading and non-trading sectors in a multi-jurisdictional trading 
system, but we adopt a strategic game-theoretic perspective: Emission trading systems that 
comprise several countries – such as the EU ETS or likewise an international quota market 
under the Kyoto Protocol – raise a strategic question as to how many quotas a country should 
allocate into the trading system. A country that expects to be a net seller of quotas can find it 
profitable to restrict the number of quotas issued such as to raise the equilibrium price of 
quotas in the market. If a quota market only covers a subgroup of domestic emissions (e.g., 
EU ETS), the relevant question is how to partition the national emissions cap on the sectors 
within and outside the trading system: When a large net seller reduces its number of 
allowances in order to raise the price of quotas, it simultaneously increases the emissions 
allowances available for its non-trading sectors, reducing the marginal abatement costs there. 
Consequently, we end up with different marginal abatement costs across countries in the 
sectors outside the EU ETS.  
 
We employ a numerical model of the European carbon market to examine the effects of 
strategic partitioning in the EU ETS. Based on quantitative simulation results our main 
insights can be summarized as follows:  
 
If all EU member states were to behave strategically in a Nash-Cournot manner, or if there is 
a Stackelberg leader (where the other countries act as followers playing a Nash-Cournot 
game), the outcome of strategic partitioning is close to the cost-effective cooperative trading 
system including all sectors and countries. This result follows from the large number of EU 
member states (with sufficiently large shares in overall EU emissions) and limited scope of 
terms of trade effects related to the price of emissions only. Strategic partitioning by all 
countries has only minor effects on total compliance cost and the price of tradable emissions 
allowances. However, compared to the cost-effective outcome, marginal abatement costs in 
the non-trading sectors become markedly differentiated and more abatement takes place in the 
old member states that are importers of emissions allowances.  
Single countries can nevertheless substantially affect the outcome of the EU ETS: If the 
reference point for strategic partitioning of a single country is the bundle of actual NAPs by 
the remaining countries, our quantitative results indicate substantial scope for exploiting 
market power. This finding relates to the following insight. 
Implementation of the actual national allocation plans approved for the second ETS trading 
phase from 2008 to 2012 will lead to drastic overall efficiency losses as compared to a cost-
effective comprehensive EU cap-and-trade system: The reason is that the partitioning of 
national emissions budgets based on actual NAPs leads to huge differences between the 
harmonized carbon value in the trading sectors and the marginal abatement costs in non-
                                                 
2 The efficiency cost of hybrid emissions regulation has been discussed by various other authors before (see e.g. Böhringer et 
al., 2005, 2006): Obviously, the segmentation of the EU carbon market will induce efficiency losses from restricted where-
flexibility  in so far as marginal abatement costs in non-trading sectors are different from the marginal abatement costs in 
the trading sectors. 
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trading sectors as well as to drastic differences of marginal abatement costs across non-trading 
sectors in different EU member states.3 
 
Our game-theoretic investigation is complementary to previous empirical analyses of the 
national allocation plans. The latter stress that allowance allocation to the trading scheme has 
been quite generous compared to a cost-effective strategy, indicating that lobbying from 
industries has been influencing the member states’ NAPs. This has been particularly the case 
in the first phase, but also applies to some degree in the second phase (e.g., Böhringer et al., 
2006; Betz et al., 2006; Neuhoff et al., 2006, Anger et al. 2008). Our analysis clearly confirms 
the political economy forces behind EU climate policy, as strategically motivated NAPs are 
far off from the actual NAPs.  
 
Starting from the seminal paper by Hahn (1984), there is a large literature on market power 
and emissions trading. Contrary to our setting, the bulk of the literature focuses on strategic 
behavior among firms that are covered by the emission trading system, and not on strategic 
allocation of quotas into the system (see e.g. Misiolek and Elder, 1989;  Hagem and Westskog 
1998; Eshel, 2005).  
 
Helm (2003) examines the outcome of introducing trade in permits between countries without 
any emissions obligations, compared to a non-cooperative outcome without trade in permits. 
He shows that countries that are most environmentally concerned tend to reduce the number 
of permits, whereas less concerned countries tend to increase the number. Even though cost-
effectiveness is increased, the effects on total emissions and total welfare are ambiguous. 
 
Strategic behavior in the quota market has been widely discussed and analyzed in relation to 
Russia’s dominant position in the international quota market (under Kyoto), see, e.g., 
Böhringer and Löschel (2003), Maeda (2003), Hagem and Mæstad (2006), or Böhringer et al. 
(2007). Being a large seller of quotas, it may be profitable for the country to restrict the export 
of quotas. This would imply that marginal abatement costs in Russia are below the 
international quota price, and it is even possible that Russia finds it optimal not to use all its 
quotas.  
 
Viguier et al. (2006) investigate the strategic allocation of emissions allowances in the EU 
ETS. They consider four (groups of) countries, which can choose between four explicit 
allowance allocation rules. A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is searched for, and a global 
CGE model is used to evaluate the different outcomes. Their focus is on the choice of discrete 
allocation rules and incentives to subsidize energy-intensive industries through generous 
allocation. They find that different country groups end up choosing different allocation rules. 
  
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an analytical 
framework and lay out strategic considerations with respect to the partitioning of emissions 
allowances. In Section 3, we briefly describe our numerical model for the EU carbon market 
that is used to investigate our theoretical propositions based on empirical data. In Section 4, 
we present policy scenarios and discuss simulation results. In Section 5, we conclude.  
                                                 
3 The member states have got limited access to trade allowances outside the EU. Access to a common offset market will 
probably reduce some of the efficiency cost.  
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2. Theoretical model 
In our theoretical analysis we consider N countries. Each country has a national emissions 
obligation given by ên. Furthermore, the countries agree to establish an emission trading scheme 
(ETS), which covers specific firms (hereafter interchangeably used with sectors) in these 
countries. Each country is free to choose how many allowances qn it wants to issue in the ETS. 
Allowances are distributed to ETS sectors (T sectors) in a lump-sum way, e.g. through pure 
grandfathering.4 Note that the number of allocated allowances determines the emissions 
obligation for the non-trading part of the domestic economy (NT sectors), which are not covered 
by the trading scheme, i.e., en,NT = ên - qn. We ignore the possibility of any emissions trading 
outside the ETS (i.e., firms within the ETS can only trade with other firms within the ETS, and 
the emissions obligation for the rest of the economy must be fulfilled domestically).5  
 
We assume that ETS firms do not have market power – consequently, each firm will reduce 
emissions until marginal abatement costs are equal to the allowance price σ. Thus, emissions 
en,T from the T sectors in country n are a function of the allowance price, given by en,T = en,T 
(σ). The country’s abatement costs in the T sectors can then be represented by the function 
Cn,T (en,T). We further assume that abatement within each country’s NT sectors takes place in a 
cost-effective way, i.e., marginal abatement costs are equalized across NT sectors within a 
country (e.g., by means of a domestic allowance market or carbon tax). Thus, we may also 
represent a country’s abatement costs in the NT sectors by Cn,NT (en,NT). 
 
The allowance price σ can be expressed as a function of the total number of allowances, i.e., 
σ=σ(∑qn), where the functional form depends on the national emissions captured by en,T(σ). 
We now want to consider the optimization problem of country n, where the only control 
variable is the number of allocated allowances, i.e., qn. We assume that country n takes into 
account its influence on the allowance price through its choice of qn, and that it considers the 
other countries’ choice of qn as exogenous. That is, we consider a Nash-Cournot equilibrium 
where all countries choose their allocation decision simultaneously. The optimization problem 
for country n is then given by: 
 
(1) ( ), , , , ,Min ( ) ( )
n
n T n T n NT n NT n m n T nq m n
C e C e q q e qσ
≠
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
+ + + − =⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑  
( ), , , ,Min
n
n T n T n m n NT n n n m n T n m nq m n m n m n
C e q q C ê q q q e q q qσ σ σ
≠ ≠ ≠
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
+ + − + + + −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑  
 
The first part of the objective function – as restated in the second line of formula (1) – is the 
costs of abatement in the T sectors, which depend on the allowance price, which again 
depends on the total number of allowances. The second part is the costs of abatement in the 
NT sectors, which depend on country n’s number of allowances. The third part is the net 
import of allowances, which depends on the allowance price, and country n’s emissions in the 
T sector and number of allowances.  
                                                 
4 Auctioning of allowances would give the same conclusions. Other allocation schemes may lead to different results as the 
allocation rule itself may influence the behaviour of the companies so that marginal abatement costs no longer equal the 
allowance price (see, e.g., Böhringer and Lange, 2005, and Rosendahl, 2008). 
5 If there were no limitations to such external trading at a fixed price, any strategic behaviour would be pointless, and we 
would end up with the cost-effective outcome with a price equal to the external price. With limited access to external 
trading, which is the reality in the EU, the outcome would be somewhere between the cost-effective outcome and the 
outcome analysed here. 
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The first order condition with respect to qn is given by: 
 
(2) ( ) ( ), , , , ,' ' ' ' ' ' ' 1 0n T n T n R n T n n TC e C e q eσ σ σ σ− + ⋅ − + ⋅ − = . 
 
As –Cn,T ' = σ, this reduces to: 
 
(3) ( ), ,' 'n NT n T nC e qσ σ− = − ⋅ − . 
 
We assume that all reaction curves are downward sloping, i.e.,  / 0n mdq dq <  for all n,
6 and 
there is a stable and unique Nash equilibrium (our simulations confirm that this is the case).  
 
If country n has no influence on the allowance price (i.e., σ’ is approximately zero), we obtain 
the standard competitive market outcome: The number of allowances should be set so that 
marginal abatement costs in the NT sectors equal the allowance price. Consequently, all firms 
in the economy (inside and outside the ETS) have the same marginal abatement costs. We 
shall denote this volume of allowances qnC, where C stands for competitive. 
 
For the case that country n is large enough to influence the allowance price through its 
allocation of allowances, it is optimal for the country to play strategically by allocating more 
or less allowances than qnC. If country n is a net importer with qn = qnC, then the last part of 
equation (3) is positive. Hence, the marginal abatement costs in the NT sectors should exceed 
the allowance price, implying that it is optimal to increase the number of allowances 
compared to qnC. The reason is that an increased number of allowances reduces the price of 
allowances, which then drives down the import costs for country n. In effect, the country is 
able to influence its terms of trade by regulating the number of allowances.  
 
Obviously, strategic behavior implies that abatement no longer takes place in a cost-effective 
way. Marginal abatement costs are still equal across firms and countries in the T sectors. 
However, marginal abatement costs in the NT sectors will in general differ across countries, 
and also differ compared to the T sectors. The larger the import or export of allowances is for 
a country in the cost-effective outcome, the more will marginal abatement costs in the NT 
sector differ from the allowance price in the ETS. We should expect this to be particularly 
relevant for large countries and countries with either very cheap or very expensive abatement 
target. 
 
How will the allowance market be affected by such strategic behavior? As some countries are 
exporters and some are importers, the strategic effect will pull in different directions for 
different countries. Thus, the allowance price can either rise or fall as a consequence of 
strategic behavior. As a matter of fact, it will depend on how steep the marginal abatement 
cost curves are in the NT sectors of the different countries.7 By summing equation (3) over all 
countries we obtain: 
 
(4) ( ),1 'n NT
n
C
n
σ = −∑ . 
                                                 
6 The reaction curves are somewhat different from a regular Nash-Cournot game in quantities, as a change in another 
countries’ allocation affects domestic firms’ demand for permits (via changed permit price). This effect bears an influence 
on the optimal reaction for country n.  
7 By “steep” we mean how much (-Cn,NT) increases when emissions decline by one unit. 
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That is, the quota price in the Nash equilibrium will equal the un-weighted average of 
marginal abatement costs in the NT sectors of all countries. Assume that σ rises compared to 
the competitive outcome. Then the total number of allowances must be lower, which again 
implies that total abatement in the NT sectors will be lower. On the other hand, we see from 
equation (4) that the average marginal abatement costs must increase. Therefore, a higher σ 
requires countries with an increased number of allowances8 (compared to qnC) to have on 
average steeper marginal abatement cost functions than the other countries. As a consequence, 
we should expect rather small effects on the equilibrium price compared to the competitive 
outcome. 
 
So far we have assumed that the N countries take part in a Nash-Cournot game. Alternatively, 
we might assume that only a subgroup N* of the N countries (where 1≤N*<N) play Nash-
Cournot, whereas the other countries behave differently. If the latter decide on their allocation 
prior to the Nash-Cournot players (i.e. their allocation is determined independently of the 
other N* countries’ allocation), we get the same optimization problem as before (but only for 
the N* countries). 
 
A different game will occur if we instead assume that one – presumably large – country S acts 
as a Stackelberg leader, and that the remaining countries act as followers (still playing a Nash-
Cournot game). This could be the case if one country decides on its allocation before the other 
countries. For instance, member states in the EU ETS have typically delivered their NAPs to 
the EU Commission at different points in time. An interesting question is therefore to what 
degree a country may benefit from being a Stackelberg leader (compared to the Nash 
solution). 
 
The Stackelberg leader knows that the other countries will take into account its decision 
regarding the number of allowances qS. For downward sloping reaction curves, we can 
express qm as a decreasing function of qS, i.e., qm = qm (qS) with qm‘<0. Replacing the fixed qm 
by qm (qS) in the optimization problem (1) gives the following first-order condition for qS: 
 
(5) ( ), ,' ' 1 '( )S NT m S S T S
m S
C q q e qσ σ
∉
⎛ ⎞
− = − ⋅ + ⋅ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ . 
 
Compared to the Nash-Cournot outcome in equation (3), the last part has changed: A given 
import (or export) of allowances has less of an impact on the allowance price because the 
other countries will respond so as to dampen the price effect (the first parenthesis is less than 
one). Consequently, it is optimal for the Stackelberg leader to deviate less from the 
competitive outcome than in the case where qm is considered fixed (i.e., the Nash-Cournot 
game), since the benefits of deviating from its cost-effective solution is reduced. In effect, 
marginal abatement costs in the NT sectors of country S will be closer to the marginal 
abatement costs in the T sectors. If country S is a net importer (exporter) of allowances, then 
the allowance price will be higher (lower) than in the Nash-Cournot solution.9 
                                                 
8 Note that the increased number of allowances allocated to T sectors implies increased abatement in the NT sectors. 
9 Our Nash and Stackelberg solutions above share similarities with the outcome of strategic behaviour examined in various 
studies of the Kyoto Protocol. For instance, it is optimal for large allowance sellers such as Russia to restrict its sales of 
allowances in order to push the price upwards (see, e.g., Maeda, 2003). However, there is one important difference. In the 
Kyoto-studies all domestic firms are treated equally, so that marginal abatement costs should be equal (and possibly zero) 
inside the large allowance seller. In our case, the marginal abatement costs will differ between the two sectors of the 
economy, both in the country being a Stackelberg leader and in the countries playing Nash-Cournot. 
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3. Numerical Framework 
In order to quantify the potential effects of strategic behavior in the EU ETS, we employ a 
simple numerical partial equilibrium model of the EU-27 carbon market. The model is based 
on marginal abatement cost curves for trading sectors (labeled: T) that are covered by the ETS 
and non-trading sectors (labeled: NT) outside the EU ETS. The cost curves are calibrated to 
empirical data (see e.g. Böhringer et al. (2005) for an algebraic documentation).  
 
Marginal costs of emissions abatement may vary considerably across countries and sectors 
due to differences in carbon intensity, initial energy price levels, or the ease of carbon 
substitution possibilities. Continuous marginal abatement cost curves for the T and NT sectors 
in EU countries can be derived from a sufficiently large number of discrete observations for 
marginal abatement costs and the associated emissions reductions in the T and NT sectors. In 
applied research these values are often generated by partial equilibrium models of the energy 
system (such as the POLES model by Criqui and Mima (2001) or the PRIMES model by 
Capros et al. (1998)) that embody a detailed bottom-up description of technological options. 
Another possibility is to derive marginal abatement cost curves from computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models (see e.g., Eyckmans et al., 2001). We adopt the latter approach and 
generate a reduced form of complex CGE interactions in terms of marginal abatement cost 
curves that are directly accessible to the non-CGE specialist. In order to obtain such marginal 
abatement cost curves for the T and NT sectors across EU countries, we make use of the 
PACE model - a standard multi-region, multi-sector CGE model for the EU economy (for a 
detailed algebraic exposition see e.g. Böhringer, 2002) based on most recent consistent 
accounts of EU member states’ production and consumption, bilateral trade and energy flows 
(see the GTAP6 database – Dimaranan and McDougall, 2006). With respect to the analysis of 
carbon abatement policies, the sectors in the model have been carefully selected to keep the 
most carbon-intensive sectors in the available data as separate as possible. The energy goods 
identified in the model include primary energy carriers (coal, natural gas, crude oil) and 
secondary energy carriers (refined oil products and electricity). Furthermore, the model 
features three additional energy-intensive non-energy sectors (iron and steel; paper, pulp and 
printing; non-ferrous metals) whose installations – in addition to the primary and secondary 
energy branches – are subject to the EU Emission Trading Scheme. The remaining 
manufacturers and services are aggregated to a composite industry that produces a non-
energy-intensive macro good, which together with final demand captures the activities (NT 
segments) that are not included in the EU ETS.  
 
To generate our reduced form model, we perform a sequence of carbon tax scenarios for each 
region (most regions consist of only one EU country), where we impose uniform carbon taxes 
(starting from $0 to $100 per ton of carbon in steps of $1). We thereby generate a large 
number of marginal abatement costs, i.e., carbon taxes, and the associated emissions 
reductions in T and NT sectors. The final step involves a fit to the set of “observations”. 
Various types of functional forms could be employed (see e.g., Böhringer and Löschel, 
2003).10 For our numerical framework, we apply a least-square fit by a polynomial of third 
degree, which provides sufficient flexibility.  
 
                                                 
10 Baseline emissions levels e0 do not impose a binding emissions reduction – hence, the associated marginal abatement costs 
for emissions use at the baseline level are zero. Clearly, zero marginal abatement costs also hold for emissions levels e > 
e0. 
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The functional form of the marginal abatement cost curves in region n for the T and NT 
sectors is, thus, given by: 11 
 
(6) { }NTTieeaeeaeeaeC ininininininininininin ,)(3)(2)(1)( 3,0,,2,0,,,0,,,, ∈−+−+−=′−  
 
Figures 1a and 1b show the associated marginal abatement cost curves for the top-five carbon 
emitting EU countries. Obviously, (marginal) abatement cost curves together with the 
effective reduction requirements for T and NT sectors are critical elements for the concrete 
quantitative simulation results. One immediate observation from Figures 1a and 1b is that the 
marginal abatement cost curves are steeper in the NT sectors than in the T sectors, except in 
France (where most power production is carbon-free). 
 
Figure 1a. Marginal Abatement Cost Curves for T Sectors across the Top 5 EU Emitters 
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11 The coefficients for region- and sector-specific marginal abatement costs curves are provided in the Appendix so that the 
reader can reproduce the numerical results based on the data in Table 1. The model and data to reproduce our results are 
also available from the authors upon request. 
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Figure 1b. Marginal Abatement Cost Curves for NT Sectors in the Top 5 EU Emitters 
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4. Policy Scenarios and Numerical Results 
The EU ETS is the main instrument of EU climate policy to comply with its Kyoto emission 
reduction target. Under the Kyoto Protocol the European Union is legally committed to cut 
back EU-wide greenhouse gas emissions by 8 per cent from 1990 emissions levels during the 
Kyoto commitment period 2008-2012. The aggregate EU reduction requirement has been 
redistributed among individual member states according to an EU-internal Burden Sharing 
Agreement (BSA) (EU, 1999). Table 1 summarizes the country-specific data for the BSA 
(column [5]) together with historic CO2 emissions in 1990 (column [1]) and future business-
as-usual (BaU) CO2 emissions in 2010 (columns [2] – [4]), the central year for meeting the 
EU climate policy targets under the EU BSA.12 The figures for future BaU emissions in 2010 
are based on official EU projections (EU, 2003b) incorporating country-specific 
developments and regulations apart from the EU ETS. 
 
The average annual national emissions budgets for the Kyoto commitment period follow from 
the BSA and the historic emissions levels in 1990. These budgets were partitioned within the 
national allocation plans for the second phase of the EU ETS between the trading (T) and non-
trading (NT) sectors. Columns [6] – [8] of Table 1 report the implied CO2 reduction 
requirements in absolute quantities based on recent information by the EU Commission (EU 
2007). Finally, columns [9] – [11] translate the absolute quantities into per cent reduction 
requirements from 2010 BaU emissions levels. 
 
 
                                                 
12 In our quantiative analysis, we use the greenhouse gas emission reduction targets of the EU member states interchangeably 
as reduction targets for CO2, which is by far the most relevant greenhouse gas for the EU.  
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Column [9] of Table 1 provides evidence on huge cross-country differences with respect to 
per cent emission reduction requirements in 2010. The old EU member states except for 
Finland show all positive reduction requirements ranging from less than 5 per cent (Sweden 
and United Kingdom) up to more than 25 per cent (Portugal and Ireland). The large 
differences in reduction requirements clearly indicate that efficiency gains from trade in 
allowances between these countries may be large. When we account for the new member 
states, the differences become even bigger: All new member states stand out for negative total 
abatement requirements, which can be traced back to significant reductions in BaU emissions 
compared to 1990. Incorporating these countries into a pan-European trading scheme should 
provide substantial cost reductions compared to domestic abatement only. It must be noted 
though that part of the cost reduction might come from trade in hot air, i.e., unused emissions 
allowances of new member states for the case of domestic action only. Another observation 
from Table 1 is that the allocation of abatement requirements between sectors within the EU 
ETS (T) and the non-trading sectors (NT) varies a lot. Thus, one might suspect that the NAP 
allocations may lead to rather cost-inefficient emissions reductions in the EU. 
 
For our numerical analysis of strategic allowance allocation we define six policy scenarios 
that differ in assumptions on the scope of EU-wide emissions trading (i.e., no international 
emissions trading, partial international emissions trading across T sectors, and comprehensive 
international emissions trading across T as well as NT sectors) and the carbon market structure 
(i.e., perfect competition vis-à-vis Cournot competition with or without a Stackelberg leader).   
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the key differences across the six specified scenarios. 
 
NoTrade: All EU member states achieve their reduction target domestically in an 
efficient way. This is equivalent to a situation in which countries apply 
domestic carbon taxes that are high enough to meet their individual 
commitments under the EU BSA. National carbon markets are assumed to 
work perfectly competitive. The NoTrade scenario provides a useful reference 
point for the potential cost savings from international emissions trading. 
Trade:  All EU member states are allowed to trade emissions allowances among each 
other without any trading restrictions between sectors. Countries behave as 
price takers, i.e., perfect competition in the permit market is assumed. The 
outcome of scenario Trade is the least-cost solution from an EU-wide social 
planner perspective. 
FullNash: EU member states act simultaneously as Nash-Cournot players when designing 
the national allocation plans. The segmentation of the national emissions 
budget between T and NT industries is thus a strategic choice variable. The 
equilibrium for scenario FullNash can be computed as the intersection of 
regional best-response functions. 
Stackelberg: One EU member state acts as a Stackelberg leader, deciding its NAP before the 
other member states, and knowing their strategic behaviour. The other EU 
member states act simultaneously as Nash-Cournot players, just as in 
FullNash, taking the Stackelberg leader’s NAP as fixed. 
NAP:  This scenario reflects the actual implementation of EU climate policy through 
the national allocation plans. It implies one single EU-wide emissions market 
for industries (T) that are covered by the EU ETS, plus a domestic carbon 
market in each EU member state for the remaining industries (NT) that are not 
covered by the EU ETS. The partitioning of the national budgets consistent to 
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the EU BSA follows the most recent approved policy proposals for the second 
phase of the EU ETS (EU, 2007). 
SingleNash: Only one specific EU member state acts as a Nash-Cournot player, taking the 
approved NAPs of the other EU member states as given. This scenario 
investigates the incentives for a single country to deviate from the scenario 
NAP in order to minimize its own compliance cost. In the context of the NAP 
approval and submission process, scenario SingleNash portrays a situation 
where an EU member state may prolong its final NAP to a point where all 
other countries have already fixed their NAPs.  
Table 2. Characteristics of Policy Scenarios 
 EU-wide Emissions Trading Carbon Market Structure 
 T sectors NT sectors  
NoTrade No No Perfect competition 
Trade  Yes Yes Perfect competition 
FullNash Yes No Nash-Cournot competition 
Stackelberg Yes No Stackelberg and Nash-Cournot competition 
NAP Yes No Perfect competition 
SingleNash Yes No Nash-Cournot competition 
 
For our subsequent discussion of simulation results,13 it should be noted that there are two 
major determinants in our partial equilibrium framework for the country-specific compliance 
cost: (i) the effective reduction requirement a country has to fulfill as compared to its 
reference emissions level (here: BaU emissions in 2010 – see column [9] of Table 1) – the 
higher the effective reduction requirement the higher are the associated compliance costs, and 
(ii) the ease of carbon abatement as captured by the shape of the marginal abatement cost 
curves – the steeper the marginal abatement cost curve the more costly a given reduction 
becomes. 
 
Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that countries with zero compliance costs under 
NoTrade do not face a binding emissions target, i.e., they typically dispose of hot air. 
Countries with hot air mainly comprise the new EU accession states (Baltic States, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Rest of Europe). As we will see 
below, this implies that total emissions reductions (or likewise environmental effectiveness) 
differ between the scenarios, since hot air is locked up in the NT sectors in three of the 
scenarios (NoTrade, NAP, and SingleNash). 
 
Throughout our quantitative analysis, we disregard the possibilities to purchase emissions 
allowances from outside the EU. Under the EU ETS, firms are to some degree allowed to buy 
project-based emissions reductions in developing countries (via the Clean Development 
Mechanism – CDM) or other industrialized countries listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol 
(via Joint Implementation – JI). However, commentators on the CDM and JI market agree 
that the magnitude of project-based allowance supply from outside the EU during the second 
                                                 
13 For reasons of data availability two of our model regions consist of several member states, which means that assumptions 
about strategic behaviour are questionable. Therefore, we omit results for the heterogeneous aggregate ‘Rest of Europe’ 
(comprising Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, and Luxembourg) in our reporting below, but only consider the more homogeneous 
composite ‘Baltic States’ (consisting of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia). 
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phase of the EU ETS will be relatively modest for several reasons (including the long-lead 
times in developing, financing and enacting these projects, investment risks and transaction 
costs, or increased competition for CDM/JI between non-EU actors and installations in the 
EU ETS. They conclude that the price effects of CDM/JI offsets will be rather small (Convery 
and Redmond, 2007). Member state governments, too, are allowed to trade allowances 
outside the EU, and can also take part in the international quota market under Kyoto. 
However, the EU has put an upper limit to each member state’s total access to external 
allowances, i.e., the sum of government purchases and the access for domestic firms to buy 
CDM/JI allowances (cf., EU, 2006). 
  
Tables 3-5 report the main results for the policy scenarios:14 In Tables 3a and 3b we see how 
the carbon values or likewise marginal abatement costs vary across countries and sectors;15 
Table 4 depicts the country-specific total compliance cost under the EU burden sharing 
agreement; Table 5 provides insights into net trade flows of emissions allowances. 
 
Potential Efficiency Gains from Where-Flexibility: NoTrade versus Trade 
We first look into the economic implications for scenarios NoTrade and Trade that capture 
the full range of international where-flexibility on competitive carbon markets: For domestic 
action only (NoTrade), marginal abatement costs vary significantly across the member states 
reflecting the large differences in effective emission reduction requirements (see column [9] 
of Table 1) and the differences in marginal abatement cost curves (see Figure 1).  
Comprehensive emissions trading under Trade reduces EU-wide compliance cost by more 
than one order of magnitude. This is partly due to the gains from unrestricted where-
flexibility, i.e., the equalization of marginal abatement costs across all sectors and countries. 
In addition, the Trade scenario exploits all the hot air in the new member states, meaning that 
total emissions reductions in the EU are substantially lower than in the NoTrade scenario – 
note, however, that the full use of hot air does not conflict with the Kyoto commitment. 
 
Efficiency Losses from Strategic Behavior: FullNash and Stackelberg compared to Trade 
Let us now turn to the implications of strategic partitioning of emissions budgets that is 
opened up under the EU ETS with decentralized national allocation plans.  
 
First, we notice from Table 3a that the carbon equilibrium price in the EU ETS is almost 
unchanged compared to the competitive full trade outcome (scenario Trade) when all 
countries act as Nash-Cournot players (scenario FullNash). Given our theoretical discussion 
in Section 2, this result does not really come as a surprise. Quota importers have incentives to 
overallocate to their T sectors, trying to reduce the price, whereas quota exporters have the 
opposite incentives. One consequence of this is reduced trade in allowances: From Table 5 we 
see that overall trade is slightly reduced in the FullNash scenario compared to the Trade 
scenario. 
 
Second, if we look at the marginal abatement costs outside the EU ETS in Table 3b, we note 
that these vary quite a lot across countries, although at a relatively small absolute level (CO2 
values are ranging from €1.3 to €5.8 per ton of CO2). In the Trade scenario the new member 
states are large exporters of quotas, and so they underallocate to the T sectors in the FullNash 
                                                 
14 In the tables, under Stackelberg we only report the effects in the country that acts as a Stackelberg leader. Similarly, under 
SingleNash we only report the effects in the country that acts as a Nash-Cournot player. 
15 The carbon values  in Table 3a are equivalent to the quota price in the EU ETS under alternative scenarios (except for 
scenario NoTrade). 
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scenario, lowering marginal abatement costs in their NT sectors. On the other hand, large old 
member states like Spain, France, Germany and Italy are distinct quota importers in the Trade 
scenario, and thus end up with higher marginal abatement costs in their NT sectors in the 
FullNash scenario. This implies that total emissions reductions in the latter four countries are 
11 per cent higher than in the cost-effective Trade solution. 
 
From a social planer perspective concerns on larger efficiency losses due to strategic behavior 
are misplaced should all EU member states behave simultaneously in a Nash-Cournot manner. 
The overall (net) costs of the FullNash solution are only 2.9 per cent higher than in the cost-
effective outcome (see Table 4). Exporters of permits stand to lose slightly, whereas permit 
importers face a small cost reduction (1-2 per cent) because of the allowance price decrease. 
In a nutshell: As all countries depart from their domestic cost-effective position in order to 
influence carbon values, the implied changes are very small for all countries (with rather 
negligible aggregate efficiency losses). 
 
Finally, we find that the benefits from being a Stackelberg leader (compared to the full Nash 
solution) are insignificant (see Table 4). As laid out in Section 2, the Stackelberg leader will 
choose an allocation between its allocation in FullNash and in Trade. Since these two 
scenarios turn out to be very similar, there is not much room for the Stackelberg leader to gain 
any advantage. When the Stackelberg leader is an importer of permits, the permit price ends 
up between the FullNash-price and the Trade-price (but much closer to the former price). 
Otherwise, the permit price falls marginally below the FullNash-price. 
 
The Grand Pitfall – Efficiency Losses from Carbon Market Segmentation: NAP 
When we assess the actual partitioning of national emissions budgets under scenario NAP, the 
striking insight is that climate policy practice in the EU comes at very high cost (cf. Table 4). 
In fact, the outcome for NAP is even more costly than the NoTrade solution, and thus more 
than an order of magnitude more costly than the cost-effective outcome under Trade. The 
reason is that segmentation of the EU carbon market in one international market for T sectors 
and 27 domestic markets for NT sectors based on the actual national allocation plans creates 
huge differences between harmonized carbon value in the trading sectors and the marginal 
abatement costs in non-trading sectors as well as to drastic differences of marginal abatement 
costs across non-trading sectors in different EU member states (as mentioned before, limited 
access of EU market segments to a common offset market will probably reduce the magnitude 
of excess cost to some extent). 
 
From a single country perspective, most of the old member states (EU-15) seem to have 
overallocated allowances to their T sectors. At least, the marginal abatement costs are 
generally higher in the sectors outside the EU ETS, with the UK as a significant exception (cf. 
Table 3b). On the other hand, the new member states seem to have underallocated allowances 
from a cost-efficiency perspective as no abatement is required in the NT sectors of these 
countries. One might argue that this is to avoid the use of hot air, as the emissions reductions 
in the NAP scenario are almost three times higher than in the Trade scenario. However, the 
same overall reduction could obviously be met in a more cost-effective way. 
 
Comparison of the competitive NAP outcome with the strategic outcomes under FullNash and 
Stackelberg clearly indicates that the actual partitioning of emissions allowances in policy 
practice has not been driven by mutually consistent strategic behavior of single countries but 
must be rather traced back to political economy considerations (see Anger et al., 2008). 
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Strategic Behavior Revisited – Market Power May Matter: SingleNash 
Finally, we discuss the case when only one country acts as a Nash-Cournot player, taking all 
the actual NAPs of all other countries as fixed. In this case, we see that market power matters. 
The effects of strategic partitioning by a single country on the quota price in T sectors are 
much more visible than under FullNash (or likewise Stackelberg). The price varies between 
€6.4 and €11.0 per ton of CO2. Thus, a single country can affect the EU ETS quite 
significantly by changing its allocation towards the most profitable one, given that other 
countries have already fixed their allocation. There are two reasons for why we observe 
greater effects in these SingleNash scenarios. First, the starting point is now the NAP scenario, 
which we know is far from cost-effective: When a single country acts as a Nash-Cournot 
player, it first of all brings marginal abatement costs in its NT sector closer to its T sector. For 
some countries, this means significant changes in their allocation. Second, in the FullNash 
scenario the strategic partitioning by one country is more or less cancelled out by strategic 
partitioning by other countries.  
5. Conclusions 
The decentralized EU ETS opens up for strategic partitioning of emissions allowances by the 
member states. Based on simulations with a partial equilibrium model of the EU carbon 
market, we have examined the potential effects of such strategic behavior on carbon prices 
and abatement costs. We have found that strategic partitioning of all EU member states has 
only minor effects on total compliance cost and the price of tradable emissions allowances as 
compared to a cost-effective outcome with comprehensive competitive emissions trading.  
However, when we refer to actual policy practice, single countries may nevertheless 
substantially affect the outcome of the EU ETS: Taking the actual – rather cost-ineffective – 
national allocation plans by other countries as given, some countries can significantly benefit 
from strategic behavior. 
 
The EU Commission’s proposal for a new Post-2012 emission trading directive suggests that 
there will be no room for strategic behavior among the member states beyond 2012, as the 
allocation rules, including the number of auctioned quotas, will be determined at the 
centralized EU level (EU, 2008). On the other hand, future links between the EU ETS and 
emission trading schemes in other countries (including the USA, Japan, or Canada) are put 
forward in the proposed directive. With fewer, but larger strategic players, a game in 
allocation of emissions allowances could in that case lead to more significant strategic effects 
than what we have found for the EU ETS. Hence, the general issue of strategic allowance 
allocation may become some leverage when we think about global trading initiatives across 
multiple jurisdictions. 
 
In our present analysis we have only looked at the terms of trade effects related to the price of 
emissions allowance. Obviously, climate policies in the EU will also affect prices of 
emission-intensive goods. Thus, member states might exploit a broader suite of terms-of-trade 
effects through strategic allowance allocation. While such an analysis is beyond the scope of 
the present paper with its partial equilibrium framework, it could provide an interesting future 
research topic for applied general equilibrium analysis. 
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Table 3a. Marginal Abatement Costs in T Sectors in €2007 per Ton of CO2  
 NoTrade Trade FullNash Stackelberg NAP SingleNash 
  Austria            50.6  3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 9.87
  Belgium            18.9  3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 9.95
  Denmark              8.5  3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 9.51
  Finland - 3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 9.28
  France            45.7  3.90 3.82 3.84 9.51 11.04
  Germany            11.8  3.90 3.82 3.84 9.51 10.13
  Greece            20.3  3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 9.69
  Ireland            60.8  3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 9.87
  Italy            31.1  3.90 3.82 3.84 9.51 10.58
  Netherlands            19.3  3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 10.28
  Portugal            95.5  3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 10.13
  Spain            51.6  3.90 3.82 3.84 9.51 10.87
  Sweden              5.8  3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 9.48
  United Kingdom              3.6  3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 8.69
  Bulgaria - 3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 8.21
  Czech Republic - 3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 6.94
  Hungary - 3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 9.13
  Poland - 3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 6.38
  Romania - 3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 6.43
  Slovakia - 3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 9.09
  Baltic States - 3.90 3.82 3.82 9.51 7.43
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Table 3b. Marginal Abatement Costs in NT Sectors in €2007 per Ton of CO2 
 NoTrade Trade FullNash Stackelberg NAP SingleNash
  Austria            50.6  3.90 4.21 4.04 81.1 10.31 
  Belgium            18.9  3.90 4.17 4.03 57.4 10.20 
  Denmark              8.5  3.90 3.91 3.82 7.3 9.48 
  Finland - 3.90 3.71 3.82 - 9.02 
  France            45.7  3.90 5.36 5.08 55.1 12.80 
  Germany            11.8  3.90 5.49 5.17 19.4 10.58 
  Greece            20.3  3.90 4.30 4.12 50.7 10.09 
  Ireland            60.8  3.90 4.22 4.20 130.5 10.31 
  Italy            31.1  3.90 5.42 5.08 48.4 12.17 
  Netherlands            19.3  3.90 4.59 4.40 43.8 10.86 
  Portugal            95.5  3.90 4.40 4.25 451.1 10.81 
  Spain            51.6  3.90 5.83 5.28 94.5 13.09 
  Sweden              5.8  3.90 3.85 3.82 1.3 9.45 
  United Kingdom              3.6  3.90 3.77 3.79 0.5 7.57 
  Bulgaria - 3.90 2.84 2.96 - 6.76 
  Czech Republic - 3.90 1.96 2.54 - 4.35 
  Hungary - 3.90 3.63 3.67 - 8.68 
  Poland - 3.90 2.07 2.46 - 3.90 
  Romania - 3.90 1.32 2.12 - 3.31 
  Slovakia - 3.90 3.54 3.65 - 8.59 
  Baltic States - 3.90 2.39 3.11 - 5.57 
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Table 4. Compliance Costs in Million €2007 
 NoTrade Trade FullNash Stackelberg NAP SingleNash
European Union 5329.3 304.8 314.1  8190.1 
  Austria 264.3 46.2 45.4 45.4 332.9 105.2
  Belgium 112.8 46.3 45.7 45.7 282.2 91.3
  Denmark 19.3 14.1 13.9 13.9 19.3 19.1
  Finland - -10.3 -10.0 -10.0 7.7 -34.1
  France 1021.8 190.1 188.0 187.9 1105.6 475.5
  Germany 435.0 248.5 247.2 247.1 487.1 427.3
  Greece 162.7 58.9 58.0 58.0 190.7 121.7
  Ireland 293.9 46.6 45.8 45.8 474.0 105.2
  Italy 759.6 199.8 197.5 197.5 842.0 458.3
  Netherlands 259.1 102.2 100.8 100.8 452.8 209.5
  Portugal 616.1 67.1 66.0 66.0 2164.5 158.8
  Spain 1343.9 244.9 241.8 241.8 1619.6 593.4
  Sweden 3.9 3.5 3.3 3.3 5.4 2.4
  United Kingdom 37.1 36.7 36.8 36.8 43.4 -32.0
  Bulgaria - -103.7 -101.7 -101.7 -18.2 -235.1
  Czech Republic - -188.9 -184.3 -184.3 2.7 -365.9
  Hungary - -15.5 -15.1 -15.1 6.3 -56.2
  Poland - -168.0 -162.5 -162.6 145.2 -308.4
  Romania - -266.3 -260.3 -260.3 -42.5 -454.9
  Slovakia - -26.8 -26.2 -26.2 -0.4 -75.1
  Baltic States - -156.3 -153.2 -153.2 33.5 -304.6
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Table 5. Net Trade in Emissions Allowances in Million Tons of CO2 
 NoTrade Trade FullNash Stackelberg NAP SingleNash
  Austria - 11.0 11.0 11.0 1.8 8.8
  Belgium - 10.0 10.0 10.0 -3.4 5.1
  Denmark - 2.4 2.4 2.4 -0.2 -0.4
  Finland - -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -0.6 -5.4
  France - 45.3 43.9 44.2 4.0 33.0
  Germany - 49.4 47.3 47.7 -0.8 8.7
  Greece - 13.4 13.5 13.5 4.8 8.2
  Ireland - 11.0 11.0 11.0 1.6 8.7
  Italy - 46.1 45.2 45.4 11.0 30.6
  Netherlands - 22.3 22.0 22.1 -3.3 11.3
  Portugal - 16.1 16.1 16.1 1.3 13.4
  Spain - 57.6 56.8 57.1 17.2 41.9
  Sweden - 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 -0.7
  United Kingdom - -2.0 -1.5 -1.5 -8.9 -24.0
  Bulgaria - -28.5 -28.4 -28.4 -5.3 -32.0
  Czech Republic - -54.3 -53.1 -53.4 -9.5 -61.5
  Hungary - -5.8 -5.7 -5.7 -1.7 -9.5
  Poland - -52.5 -50.1 -50.5 0.2 -60.8
  Romania - -72.4 -71.5 -71.7 -11.0 -76.6
  Slovakia - -8.0 -7.9 -7.9 -1.7 -10.4
  Baltic States - -41.1 -40.9 -41.0 1.7 -42.8
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Region- and Sector-Specific Marginal Abatement Costs Coefficients. USD2001 per 
Ton of Carbon* 
 T Sectors NT Sectors 
 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3
  Austria 32.72 8.71 9.41 64.37 11.24 1.31
  Belgium 14.04 -0.47 1.34 36.77 4.13 0.34
  Denmark 18.82 -1.03 3.48 98.79 34.63 -0.87
  Finland 28.87 4.43 1.38 136.00 37.44 7.86
  France 13.01 0.60 0.82 9.78 0.28 0.01
  Germany 1.70 0.01 0.00 6.29 0.09 0.00
  Greece 15.14 -1.52 0.34 103.31 3.35 6.00
  Ireland 25.54 0.54 11.43 86.02 24.69 4.22
  Italy 4.57 0.30 0.01 13.80 0.38 0.00
  Netherlands 7.15 0.35 0.07 14.67 0.62 0.06
  Portugal 19.79 0.26 4.33 132.33 24.93 11.03
  Spain 4.54 -0.03 0.04 20.60 0.98 0.01
  Sweden 58.84 32.30 74.29 113.79 30.22 2.26
  United Kingdom 2.75 0.05 0.00 3.98 0.06 0.00
  Bulgaria 14.68 -4.48 2.02 98.93 61.54 43.19
  Czech Republic 5.06 -0.45 0.07 20.91 -1.28 1.84
  Hungary 16.23 -2.09 2.82 37.48 4.92 2.62
  Poland 2.81 -0.01 0.01 8.29 0.27 0.06
  Romania 8.79 -2.18 0.45 34.33 -0.72 1.51
  Slovakia 23.08 -3.71 7.83 67.43 25.44 13.51
  Baltic States 32.82 -17.96 12.04 82.44 -1.06 73.72
  Rest of Europe 50.02 -4.42 13.32 94.71 21.13 5.72
* The numerical results are generated in terms of USD2001 and we use a conversion factor of 1.28 to convert 
monetary values into €2007 in Tables 3-4 of our paper (the conversion factor is based on information by the EU 
website http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/ameco_applet.htm). 
